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ELECTION LAW AS A FIELD: A POLITICAL
SCIENTIST'S PERSPECTIVE
Bruce E. Cain*
If the minimal definition of a field of legal study is a collection
of cases, then election law clearly qualifies. Presently, two important
published volumes of election law cases exist-one edited by Daniel
Lowenstein' and the other by Sam Issacharoff, Pam Karlan and
Richard PildesU--covering the general areas of representation, cam-
paign finance, corruption, and the associational rights of political
parties. There are some noteworthy differences between the two
volumes: Lowenstein's covers a few more topics, such as lobbying,
and is more focused on campaign finance, while the Issacharoff-
Karlan-Pildes collection concentrates more on voting rights and ra-
cial gerrymandering. But, given the respective expertise of the vari-
ous editors and the commercial imperative to differentiate ap-
proaches, discrepancies are both understandable and sufficiently
minor so as to not detract from the basic conclusion that there is a
core to this field, about which scholars share common knowledge, if
not common conclusions.
Political scientists contribute to the election law field in three
ways. First, they study and write about many of the phenomena with
which these cases deal. For instance, political scientists such as Herb
Alexander and Gary Jacobson have studied the effects of campaign
contributions on elections and legislative behavior.3 This work has
been important to legal scholars as background material for election
* Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California at Ber-
keley.
1. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1995).
2. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1998).
3. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY,
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM, 1-8 (3d. ed. 1984) and GARY C.
JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 33-50 (1980).
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law cases, and the scholars themselves have sometimes served as ex-
pert witnesses for the courts. Secondly, democratic theory provides a
normative framework for thinking about concepts such as equity,
representation, and influence, which find their way into legal schol-
arship and judicial decisions. A good example of this, which I will
discuss in more detail later, is the way the debate over the meaning
of corruption in campaign finance invokes ideas about deliberative
and proceduralist approaches to democracy. 4 Finally, there is a small
body of political science literature which regards reform as an insti-
tutional design problem: given the goals-of democratic theory-
and the likely behavior of actors under different rules-which come
from empirical political science. It considers how laws should be re-
formed to achieve desired behavior and consequences.
5
I have participated in this field as both a scholar and an expert
witness, and in several types of election law cases. While the roles
of expert witness and scholar in this field are distinct in some ways,
they are linked in others. Scholarship gets incorporated into expert
witness testimony and, in turn, expert witness testimony gets incor-
porated into scholarship. It is my observation that the mix of theory
to empiricism varies in different types of election law cases as a con-
sequence of the specific constitutional and statutory framework in
which the case is embedded. In particular, I would distinguish two
basic types as the voting/representation cases on the one hand, and
the corruption/political association cases on the other. The vot-
ing/representation cases are primarily equal protection claims argued
within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Voting
4. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The
Root ofAll Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HoFrsTRA L. REv. 301 (1989) (delibera-
tive democracy is undermined by campaign contributions that intend to influ-
ence legislator's decisions because it forces legislators from their own ethical
beliefs); Dennis Thompson, Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating
Five, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 369 (1993) (stating that contributions that strive
to influence legislators' actions corrupt the legislators' judgment thus under-
mining both open discussion and competition of ideas which keeps democracy
ethical); and Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Re-
form, U. Chi. Legal F. vol. 1995, at 111 (focusing instead on the more com-
monly believed position of procedural democracy which favors compromise
and consensus to achieve fairness in the democratic system).
5. Many of the most avid proponents of this school of institutionalism can
be found in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (Ber-
nard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989).
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Rights Act, while almost all the other cases are First Amendment
challenges. This distinction between the two types of cases has im-
portant and well understood legal implications, but it also has im-
portant implications for the role that political science plays. In par-
ticular, the equal protection framework places political scientists into
a primarily empirical role-verifying facts that help the court deter-
mine whether a violation exists or a challenge is justified. By com-
parison, the First Amendment framework opens up broad democratic
theory questions, especially as they relate to determining compelling
state purposes. As a result, it is sometimes hard to assess the value
of proposed empirical tests because sometimes a test that validates
one normative purpose might invalidate another.6
In the sections that follow, I want to discuss the variable rela-
tionship between political science and the law in two types of cases:
voting/representation cases and corruption/political association cases.
I will review the Fourteenth Amendment cases first, and suggest that,
even though democratic theory has not played a major role in these
court decisions, the implicit democratic theory questions are actually
quite important. Then I will consider the First Amendment cases,
arguing that the strict scrutiny framework leads the Court to consider
normative and theoretical issues about what is or what is not essen-
tial for the purposes of a democratic state. Finally, I will come back
to the definition of the field of election law itself and suggest poten-
tial benefits to both the legal scholars and political scientists if we
thought of the field as political regulation rather than electoral law.
I. THE VOTING/REPRESENTATION CASES
The voting/representation cases encompass many specific legal
and empirical issues, but, implicitly, two important democratic the-
ory questions as well: 1) who should have the right to vote or, to put
it another way, who can be denied the right to vote, and 2) what is
6. See Bruce E. Cain & Marc A. Levin, Term Limits, ANN. REV. POL. SC.
(forthcoming) (discussing the conflation of normative values and empirical
knowledge). The same empirical finding about term limits can be viewed
variously through the filter of different normative values. Thus, a finding that
term limits weaken legislative expertise would be viewed as a bad develop-
ment by "professionalists" (i.e., those who prefer a strong co-equal legislature)
and a good development by "populists" (i.e., those who want the legislature to
return to its amateur ideals).
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the best meaning of an equal vote? The first issue, raised in such
cases as Kramer v. Union Free School District7 and Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District8 concerns the equal
right to a vote. In this area, the election law field has had more to
say than political science per se. Political scientists have certainly
written about and taken an interest in the progressive expansion of
the franchise since the late nineteenth century in the United States
and other western democracies. 9 However, there is little in norma-
tive political science about the reasons why individuals could be jus-
tifiably excluded from the electorate. Democratic theory teaches that
several types of representation are compatible with a democratic
form of government. Equal individual representation-the implicit
standard that courts have relied upon-is just one of a number of
democratically acceptable possibilities. However, democratic theory
to date has given very little guidance on the question of who should
or should not be allowed to vote; it simply assumes that the franchise
should be extended to the widest degree to all those who are mentally
and emotionally competent to vote responsibly.10
The Kramer line of cases were dramatic from a democratic the-
ory perspective because they raised provocative questions about
whether some exclusions make sense given a particular governmen-
tal function. The conventional public choice theory is that govern-
ments produce public goods with diffuse and non-excludable benefits
which cannot be provided by markets in an efficient fashion. The
non-exclusivity of those goods creates the near universal right among
competent adults to participate in elections that determine the level
and type of desired public goods either indirectly, through the choice
of representatives or directly, by initiative. In fact, however, the
world is not so simple. The public sector does not exclusively pro-
vide pure public goods, and markets do not exclusively produce pri-
vate goods. Sometimes, governments offer private goods and some
7. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
8. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
9. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS
DON'T VOTE (1988) (providing a general theory of voter mobilization in the
United States).
10. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1956) (illustrating the prevailing democratic theory that the right to vote
should be extended broadly).
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private companies, such as utilities, produce essentially public goods.
If a government is providing divisible benefits, then it may make
more ethical sense to institute a governance scheme in which the
franchise is limited to those who pay for and benefit from the serv-
ice. This is an important institutional design question that arises out
of case law and not political science literature. In this instance, the
field of election law has enriched democratic theory.
The larger body of cases in this area deal with the meaning of an
equal vote. These are fundamentally equal protection cases supple-
mented by statutory law, especially the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
This area is partitioned into apportionment and vote dilution. In the
apportionment cases, the United States Supreme Court has taken a
strongly egalitarian position, arguing that individuals have the right
to an equally weighted vote." Democratic theory generally, and the
Madisonian framework specifically, were on the losing side in the
Reynolds v. Sims line of decisions. Democratic theory lost in the
sense that the distinction between what is essential to a democratic
form of government and what is compatible with it was blurred by
the Court's reasoning. Prior to Reynolds, a judicious-as opposed to
judicial-reading of democratic theory would not have said that
equal individual representation was necessary in order for a society
to qualify as a democracy, but rather it was one of several acceptable
types of democratic representation. As for Madisonianism, its basic
premise was that the popular will was best checked by institutions
that were insulated from public opinion, similar to courts, or by the
competition between representatives from various types of constitu-
encies. The Reynolds cases elevated majoritarian principles over the
prudentially cautious design of the Founding Fathers. Skepticism
about the public whim has given way to reverence for the majority
will.
11. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555-61 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). The
only exceptions have been modest deviations at the state and local level in or-
der to accommodate local government subdivisions and communities of inter-
est. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973) (Virginia's 1971
reapportionment with 16% variation from the ideal district was not excessive




Although there was no study done at the time, I suspect that
many, if not most, political scientists applauded the apportionment
decisions for the same reasons that they were widely accepted by the
public. First, the Jeffersonian populist impulse is stronger in Ameri-
can culture than our understanding of and respect for our Madisonian
institutions. Second, the fact that rural areas had more representation
than the more populous urban areas seemed appallingly undemo-
cratic in a society that was increasingly based in the cities and sub-
urbs.
Their political interests aside, political scientists had valid pro-
fessional reasons to be concerned about the apportionment decisions.
To begin with, the Court annointed one theory of representation over
all others, despite a long and rich tradition of political theory that
recognizes the value and democratic compatibility of many others-a
tradition dismissed by the Court as representing trees not people. By
choosing to protect one theory of representation, the Court altered
structures of representative government that had been in place since
the eighteenth century. In so doing, they deprived the American
people of an entire class of institutional mechanisms for compromise
which could be used to solve collective action problems. For exam-
ple, when the San Francisco Bay area considered establishing a re-
gional government to cope with problems of growth and traffic man-
agement, its lawyers informed the planners that they could not design
a confederation which did not conform to the principle of one person,
one vote. 12 Since the smaller cities were unwilling to join into any
arrangement that would allow their suburban votes to be swamped by
the more numerous votes of the larger, urban cities, the governance
problem proved to be insurmountable. What the Bay Area cities
wanted was to replicate the logic of the original compromise that in-
duced smaller states to join the large state in the union at the found-
ing of the country. In effect, the courts made it impossible for mod-
em legislators to do what the Founding Fathers had been able to do.
Hence, the second reason political scientists might have opposed this
decision was to protect the right of states and local governments to
adopt flexible solutions to their governance problems.
12. See BAY VISION 2020: THE COMMISSION REPORT (1991).
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The other aspect of the apportionment cases that affected politi-
cal science was the radical alteration of the political question doc-
trine. By declaring that apportionment was justiciable, the Court in-
truded into the political design process. In a number of areas, the
courts have entered into political issues which were previously
thought to be more properly decided in arenas outside the courts.
Again, political scientists have been of two minds about this infer-
ence. On the one hand, we know that a lot of these questions have
no simple, indisputable answer, and that the Court has limited tools
to deal with these issues. On the other hand, the courts' interventions
have had valuable political consequences, achieving outcomes which
would have taken longer to achieve politically. Those who sympa-
thize with what the courts were trying to do have had to weigh the
short term gain of getting a desired outcome against the long term
problem of "judicializing" politics and institutional design.
The best illustrations of this are vote dilution cases. The two
kinds of vote dilution cases are the partisan gerrymandering and the
racial cases. In the partisan cases, court intrusion has come to a
standstill since Davis v. Bandemer"3 , in which the Court held that
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable, but set the empirical bar at
such a high level that even the infamous Burton gerrymander did not
qualify. 14 Some of us have argued for decreased judicial interven-
tion, but I suspect that, in the end, the courts will take a more active
role in partisan vote dilution cases. Redistricting research has illu-
minated the complexities of defining fairness in the redistricting pro-
cess.' 5 The problem is that there are multiple values and multiple
rankings of those values, and the pursuit of one value can frustrate
the pursuit of another. Even if we narrow the fairness question to the
13. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
14. See Badman v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd 488 U.S.
1024 (1989).
15. See generally DAvID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (1992);
BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984) (developing the
theme concerning the complexities of defining fairness in the redistricting pro-
cess). See also Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathon Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1985); Bernard Grofinan, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 185 (1985) (examining the criteria proposed to
guide districting decisions in the United States).
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fair division of representation between the parties, we still have the
complication that our single-member district system does not easily
or naturally yield proportional results.' 6 This has led Lowenstein and
Steinberg to argue that there are no manageable standards in this
area.' 7 A number of determined, reform-minded political scientists
and lawyers, among them Dan Polsby and Richard Niemi, continue
to push for more aggressive court intervention by luring the Court
with the promise of simple formalistic tests, especially compact-
ness.' 8 The Court could easily succumb to this temptation. In sum,
as compared to the Kramer line of cases, where political scientists
were uninvolved, and the apportionment cases, where political sci-
entists were mostly on the sidelines but generally supportive, the
partisan vote dilution cases present a more polarized situation, with
one faction of political scientists urging the Court to resist the temp-
tation to intervene and the other urging the Court to dive right in.
Those who want the Court to jump in are looking to the Court to
remedy a problem that is hard to solve politically. Those who oppose
judicial intervention either care more about the judicialization of
politics or do not want the problem solved for political reasons.
Political scientists have also been partisans in the racial vote di-
lution cases. Of all the areas within election law, the racial vote di-
lution topic is the best example of the law driving the political sci-
ence. First, the minority vote dilution case law has the most clearly
defined empirical issues. A political scientist who gives expert wit-
ness testimony in this kind of case understands with a high degree of
certainty what the court wants to know. Thornburg v. Gingles'9 dis-
tilled the test for a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
into a clear three-part exercise. That is not to say that Gingles re-
moved all empirical controversy. There have been scholarly disputes
about whether polarization is conclusively proven by bivariate
16. See DOUG RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS,
148-76 (1967).
17. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 52-54.
18. See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Com-
pactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 330-50 (1991); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts" and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483,
536-59 (1993).
19. 478 U.S. 30, 53 (1986).
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correlation, or whether cohesion can be measured separately from
polarization.2 0 But these are relatively technical matters-generally,
we have a clear sense in voting rights cases of the value of a fact for
the defendants versus the plaintiffs. That is not always the case in
the right of association cases.
Apart from the greater clarity of the Court's empirical needs in
this area, legal issues have driven the political science in this area in
a second sense; namely, they have helped to contribute to a growing
interest in minority voting behavior and representation issues. Most
of the voting behavior literature in the fiffies and sixties came out of
the Columbia and Michigan traditions, focusing on the "American"
voter in a highly aggregated sense.2 1 These studies tried to under-
stand such questions as how voters got their information, how they
became attached to political parties, and how they decided to vote.
Their samples reflected the largely white make-up of the national
electorate. However, by putting light on the issue of racial polariza-
tion, the Voting Rights Act litigation helped to make minority voting
behavior a more salient topic. Now it is fairly common to find stud-
ies that over-sample nonwhite groups, and to read papers that explore
the differences between nonwhite and white voters.22 The election
law field can claim to have contributed to that refocusing of electoral
behavior research.
The interaction between political science and legal scholars in
the voting/representation area is one wherein the law has generally
been more dominant than the political science. Partly due to the logic
of equal protection cases and the constraints of how these cases are
litigated, political scientists have in several instances ignored impor-
tant developments in the law, such as the Kramer questions, or
20. See generally BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY, 98-103 (1992) (providing a good
summary of these issues as they stood in the early nineties).
21. See generally PAUL LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE (1948)
(providing an example of the Columbia school tradition); ANGUS CAMPBELL
ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964) (providing an example of the Michigan
school tradition).
22. A pertinent example of this work is found in the Latino National Politi-
cal Survey. See, e.g., RUDOLFO 0. DE LA GARZA ET AL., LATINO VOICES:
MEXICAN, PUERTO RICAN AND CUBAN PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS
(1992) (discussing the results and implications of the Latino National Political
Survey undertaken between August 1989 and April 1990).
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thought about court decisions in a narrow, short term, political per-
spective, like with the apportionment cases. One important function
of the field of election law in the future is that it might serve to en-
gage political scientists more seriously in what the courts are doing
in areas that affect issues of representation.
II. SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS CASES
There are several differences between the representation/voting
rights and campaign finance/corruption cases which have important
implications for the interactions between political scientists and legal
scholars. The First Amendment framework, the primary legal tool in
the campaign finance/corruption area, is less restrictive in the sense
than its balancing logic raises more open-ended democratic theory
and empirical questions than the equal protection logic of the vot-
ing/representation cases. "Balancing logic" refers to the Court's pro-
cess of weighing the important state purposes of a law against its in-
fringement upon individual rights. Defining important state purposes
is both a normative and an empirical task. It is normative in the
sense that one has to say why a law is important to the integrity or
functioning of the democratic state, and it is empirical because one
has to show that the law will accomplish that purpose.
Consider, for illustrative purposes, the Court's rationale for up-
holding contribution limits. Since the Court excludes equity as a
proper justification for infringing upon what is essentially a right to
speech, the Court focuses instead on corruption. 23 This rationale
raises two political science questions. The normative, democratic
theory issue is whether large, unlimited contributions corrupt the in-
tegrity of the majoritarian process. The answer requires first exam-
ining a theory of what is ideal in order to understand what might be
corrupting in that context.24 This is not the time or place to revisit in
great detail the lively and extensive debate which has flourished on
this issue, but suffice it to say that whether one thinks that a contri-
bution is corrupting is very much affected by the theory of represen-
tation upon which the contribution is premised. As I have argued
23. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-29 (1975).
24. See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Re-
form, LEGAL F., 111, 113-22 (1995) (criticizing the approaches taken by Dan-
iel H. Lowenstein & Dennis F. Thompson to reform campaign finance).
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elsewhere, those who analogize a campaign contribution to a bribe
rely on the norms of trusteeship or deliberative representation.
25
Without a normative premise of that sort, it is much harder to argue
that contribution limits serve the important state purpose of limiting
corruption. If, instead, one takes a more pluralist approach and
equates money with other resources, it is harder to see the important
state purpose of limiting contributions when we do not limit the
trading of other electoral resources, such as time or the promise of a
bloc of votes.
There are also important empirical questions that arise in such
cases. Does money change the outcome of elections or the behavior
of representatives? Even if it is an important state purpose to limit
the influence of contributors more than the influence of others in the
electorate, is the influence of contributors a major problem? This
query leads to elaborate statistical tests of the impact that contribu-
tions have on the outcomes of races, or the effects that receiving a
large interest contribution have on the representatives' role-call vot-
ing.26 It has been a source of no small amount of irritation and deri-
sion among journalists and some legal scholars that political scien-
tists have not been able to conclusively prove the obvious: money
corrupts.27 Of course, proving the obvious is much harder than you
think it is before you try to do it, but there is also a strong possibility
that the obvious is not true. For instance, political scientists cannot
show conclusively that those who receive more money from an inter-
est group change their votes to accord with the interest group's
wishes. Rather, political scientists have argued that contributions
flow to those who are already supporters of the group's cause, per-
haps in order to get more access to the member.28 Similarly, it is
25. See id. at 114-22.
26. See John R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying and Committee Voting in
the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 422-433
(1990); Laura Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J.
POL. 1052, 1060 (1986); James F. Herndon, Access, Record and Competition
as Influence on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns, 44
J. POL. 996, 1011 (1982); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time:
Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,
84 AM. POL. SCI. 797, 805-809 (1990).
27. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root
ofAll Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 329 (1989).
28. See generally FRANK M. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS
AND REALITIES (1992) (discussing the ambiguities of the evidence).
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disappointing to some that our studies show that money has dimin-
ishing returns for incumbents.
29
This raises a second difference between this area and the previ-
ous one. Much of the empirical work in this area was developed in a
purely academic context by political scientists who were not em-
ployed at the time as expert witnesses. Thus, there is no urgency to
prove the particular result that reformers want to have proved. Other
studies have carefully tracked the failure of laws at the federal, state,
and local levels to achieve the goals set out by reformers.30 There is
a growing consensus that the system is not working well, but people
mean different things in saying this. Hence, political scientists, like
others, are split on the best possible policy direction to go, given the
Court's positions. Professional norms in social science dictate that,
if the data indicates a particular result, one lives with that result until
another model can better explain it in the future. One of the unfortu-
nate and worrisome byproducts of the election law-political science
interaction is that the process of being an expert witness can polarize
a scholarly debate and give incentives to stick to one side of an issue
in order to maintain a consistent reputation for the courts or to please
those who retain the expert. Fortunately, the pool of political scien-
tists in the campaign finance area is large enough that the potentially
polarizing effects of expert witness testimony on the field's scholar-
ship are limited. However, this concern may be more relevant in
smaller areas of election law such as the associational rights of po-
litical parties.
Much of the previous discussion about the campaign finance
cases also applies to the party rights cases. These cases raise rich
normative and empirical questions about the purpose and function of
political parties. For the sake of simplicity, we can subsume them
under the general issue of whether political parties have the right to
set their own rules, including the nomination process. In the White
Primary Cases, for instance, the central issue involved the right to
exclude nonwhites from party primaries that effectively controlled
29. See generally GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS (1980) (providing the first evidence of diminishing returns).
30. See generally DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL
MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING N AMERICA (1975) (dis-
cussing the objectives of legislative campaign finance reform and Frank
Sorauf s critique thereof).
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the selection of candidates who would eventually run in the general
election.31 In San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee
v. Eu32 and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticu 3, the issue
was whether the state legislature, as opposed to the state's party or-
ganizations, had the right to set party rules and nomination proc-
esses.34 In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party35 the question
was whether the state could prohibit a party from fielding fusion
candidates.
As in the campaign finance cases, the Court has tried to balance
important state interests against fundamental rights, raising both
normative and empirical questions. The normative issue is not sim-
ply about organized group autonomy in the political process. It is
also about the role that parties can play in a democracy. For a long
time, many political scientists deplored the weakness of American
political parties, and looked for ways to restore their strength.
36 Par-
ties, in this view, are a means of aggregating the specific concerns of
interest groups and voters into broader ideological themes and labels.
This has a number of benefits: it eases the decision-making burden
for voters, it causes people to see better the connection between is-
sues, it creates more teamwork incentives in the legislature, and it
limits the personality-driven politics of individual candidates.
What is interesting about these cases, as compared to appor-
tionment cases, is that political scientists have not drifted fashionably
with popular opinion on this question. The general political culture
views with suspicion proposals to strengthen parties and regards par-
ties with something between indifference and hostile opposition.
Political scientists have played a prominent role in pushing legal
31. See Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1927); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 650-52; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,462-63 (1953).
32. 826 F. 2d 814 (9th Cir. 1987).
33. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
34. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1759 (1993).
35. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
36. See AUSTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY
GOVERNMENT URBANA (1954) with NELSON W. POLSBY, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM (1983); c.f MORRIS P. FIORINA, THE
DECLINE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 109
DAEDALUS 25, 26 (1980); and KAY LAWSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1968).
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cases forward to achieve more rights for the parties.37 At one level,
their argument is that the important, anti-corruption purposes that led
to the close regulation of parties in the Progressive Era must be
traded off with other important state purposes, such as having a more
informed, more easily motivated electorate, and legislative caucuses
that provide team incentives to work together. But, at another level,
one could say that the political scientists are doing what they did in
the apportionment cases: using the courts to get what cannot be
achieved by normal political means.
Looking at the party cases, the Court's decisions appear to be
more confused and inconsistent than in the other election law areas.
As Lowenstein has argued, the Court sometimes fails to perceive that
it is being asked to adjudicate between two different sectors of a
party, such as the party in the legislature and the party as an organi-
zation.38 The Court has defended party autonomy against legislative
control in San Francisco County,39 but not against initiative action in
California's blanket primary challenge. 40 It regards the preservation
of the two party system as an important state purpose in Timmons,
despite the fact that there is no evidence that such a defense is neces-
sary or implied in the definition of a republican form of government.
Of all the political law areas we have considered thus far, this is the
one in which democratic theory could make the most positive contri-
bution, even if, for instance, it did nothing more than help define
what a party is more explicitly.
III. THE FIELD: ELECTION LAW OR POLITICAL REGULATION
Finally, I want to bring up an issue that receives scant attention.
As defined by the forum and in the casebooks, the field under discus-
sion is election law. As such, it limits the focus to the Court's deci-
sions in electoral topics. But I sense that even the legal scholars are
impatient with the boundaries of a field so narrowly defined. Frus-
tration with the Court's treatment of a given problem has driven a
37. Note that Kay Lawson and other political scientists in Northern Califor-
nia supported San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. Eu, 826
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. See Lowenstein, supra note 34, at 1759.
39. 826 F.2d at 836.




number of the legal scholars in this field to thinking about other
kinds of institutional remedies. Thus, in the case of political repre-
sentation, legal scholars like Guinier and Karlan have proposed
changes in the electoral system to use semi-political regulation or
political regulation as means of escaping the horrible dilemmas and
political controversies that come with self-consciously apportioning
political power and identity.4' In the case of campaign finance, Dan
Lowenstein has proposed designing a system that uses the parties to
aggregate and dilute out the corrupting effects of wealthy individual
and interest group donations. 42 The question we need to ask is
whether the field is really election law per se or whether it is political
regulation.
Labeling the field "political regulation" opens it up to more
genuinely interdisciplinary research and frees scholars to think about
problems in appropriate-as opposed to customary-ways. As I
have indicated already, this field consists of elements of democratic
theory, law, public policy, and empirical political science. When we
think of regulation goals, we draw from democratic theory and con-
stitutional principles. When we consider the behavior of political
actors under existing institutions, we rely on empirical political sci-
ence. When we propose reforms to bring behavior in line with goals,
we are engaging in a specialized form of public policy-making con-
cerned with institutions rather than policy programs. Thinking of the
field in this way may also help us see more clearly the proper line
between problems that are best resolved by institutional changes as
opposed to litigation and court intervention. Such an achievement
would perhaps be the most important contribution this field can make
in the end.
41. See LANI GUiNIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994); Pamela S.
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Ra-
cial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 221-36 (1989)
(examining limited and cumulative voting strategies as alternatives to single
member districts to increase minority representation).
42. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 351.
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